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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

CONSENT DECREE-A VOLUNTARY

AGREEMENT OR A COURT ORDER?-Local Number 93, Interna-

tional Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106A S.
Ct. 3063 (interim ed. 1986).
For societies, as well as individuals, it often seems easier to wish away
rather than confront the painful vestiges of past wrongdoing. It is not
easy to face the dilemmas of causal uncertainty and the dislocations
inherent in overcoming caste barriers.It is easier, and often more popular, either to posit a clean slate or to wring one's hands over the limited
effectiveness and counterproductivity of specific remedies or of governmental reform in general.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has been wrestling with constitutional challenges to voluntary affirmative action programs for more
than a decade.' In 1979, the Court first addressed the lawfulness of a
private employer's voluntary affirmative-action plan under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).2 The Court allowed for volun-

tary affirmative action programs under certain circumstances3 despite
the Title VII prohibition against discrimination. Such a conclusion,

however, raises a host of related questions in light of the specific language of Title VII. Section 706(g) of Title VII prevents courts from
ordering an employer to give preferential treatment to an employee
who is not an actual victim of discrimination." Thus, in effect, courts
* Dimond & Sperling, Book Review, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 1070 (1985) (reviewing T.
SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY (1984)).
I. See Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979) (allowing voluntary affirmative action programs); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (challenge to a medical school admissions program under which there
was a special admission program for minority students); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974) (an attack on a special law school admissions program that gave preference to minorities).
2. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Title VIl of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g) as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
3. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200.
4. Title VIi of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g) as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982). In limiting a court's remedial powers, section 706(g) provides in part:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a
member of a union or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused ... employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section
704(a).

Id.
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cannot order affirmative action programs although private and public
employers can. The question which emerges is whether consent decrees
fall within the scope of section 706(g) or whether they are considered
voluntary affirmative, action programs.
In Local Number 93, InternationalAssociation of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland,6 the Supreme Court, in a narrow ruling,6 determined that section 706(g) of Title VII does not preclude a court from
entering a consent decree which might provide relief for past
discrimination.7
This note examines the Supreme Court's recourse to a narrow interpretation of section 706(g) of Title VII in Firefightersand addresses
the question of whether a consent decree should be excluded from section 706(g)'s enforcement provision. The ostensibly conflicting policies
of affirmative action and the remedial provisions of section 706(g) are.
also reviewed. Finally, this note addresses the probable impact of the
Court's decision to uphold affirmative-action plans entered into through
consent decrees and proposes that the judicial system must continue to
resist a rigid color-blind standard when dealing with discrimination.

II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In October 1980, an association of black and Hispanic firefighters
(the Vanguards) filed a class action suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, charging their employer, the
City of Cleveland (the City), with racial discrimination in the area of
promotion. 8 This was not an unfamiliar claim. Since 1972, the City has
had to deal with various charges of racial discrimination in its promotion and hiring practices. 9 Prior to the filing of the Vangard's suit, the
City had unsuccessfully tried to defend itself against several other lawsuits alleging racial discrimination. 10 As a result, instead of entering
another round of possibly futile litigation, the City began to negotiate
with the Vanguards."
The Union of the International Association of Firefighters (Local

5. 106A S. Ct. 3063 (interim ed. 1986).
6. Id. at 3080 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 3066.
8. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479. 481 (6th Cir. 1985).
9. For example, in 1972, an action was filed against the police department alleging minority
discrimination in hiring and promotion. See Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251,
256 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (The district court enjoined various hiring and promotion tactics and ordered hiring goals for minorities.).
10. "[Wjhen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleveland had eight years at that point
of litigating these types of cases, and eight years of having judges rule against the City of Cleveland." Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, v. City of Cleveland, 106A S. Ct. 3063, 3067
(1986) (quoting the counsel for the City, arguing before the Supreme Court).
II. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3067.
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93), representing the majority of firefighters in Cleveland, was allowed
to intervene as a party-plaintiff in April of 1981.12 Subsequent to an
order by the district court, 13 Local 93 submitted its complaint in intervention, 14 expressing its view that a racial quota system of promotion
would prevent the City from "maintaining the best possible fire fighting
force." 15 The complaint asserted that competitive examinations should
be the basis for promotions,' and in a prayer for relief Local 93 requested an injunction requiring the City to base promotions upon the
results of the examinations.1
In November 1981, negotiations between the City and the Vanguards resulted in the submission of a proposed agreement to the district court."8 The proposal sought to implement temporary remedies for
past discrimination in promotions through a two-step process.' 9 The
first step reserved a set number of promotions for minorities. 0 The second step established promotion goals for minorities." By the terms of
the proposal, the City consented to discontinue the use of seniority
points as a factor in awarding promotions. 2 This plan was to be in
effect for nine years and included an option to continue the plan for
another six years if mutually agreed upon by both parties." At a twoday hearing held to consider the proposed consent decree, the district
court declined to enter the decree 2"' and "mandat[ed] the City and the
Vanguards

. .

. [to] engage [Local 93] in discussions" 25 therefore ena-

bling the Union to air its objections. The matter was then submitted to
a United States magistrate, and under his supervision the three parties
12. Id. The district court granted the motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), which
permits an intervention of right when the party claims an interest in the action and a disposition
of that action may impair his interest unless he is represented. Id.
13. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3067.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3068.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. "[Slpecifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant, 3 of 20 planned promotions
to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promotions to Battalion Chief, and I of 3 planned promotions to
Assistant Chief were made to minority firefighters." Id.
21. The goals involved future promotions for the positions of lieutenant, captain, and battalion chief. Id.
22. Id.
23. Local 93 responded by protesting their exclusion from the negotiations. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (emphasis added). At the second hearing, the district court judge proposed that the
consent decree incorporate a greater number of promotion slots than previously planned, thereby
enabling the City to promote a substantial number of minorities while still promoting the nonminority firefighters who would have been promoted under the examination/seniority system. Id. at
3068-69.
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negotiated a revised consent decree. 6 Submission of the revised decree
to the court was made contingent upon the approval of the general
membership of Local 93.27 The general membership voted overwhelmingly to reject the proposal. 8
Despite Local 93's objections, in January 1983 the district court
approved a revised consent decree similar to that rejected by Local 93's
membership.2 9 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's overruling of Local 93's objection," ° noting that the plan
neither "require[d] the hiring of unqualified minority firefighters [nor]
the discharge of any nonminority firefighters." 31
Local 93 then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which was granted. 2 In a six to three decision, the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, 3 holding that the provision in section 706(g) of Title VII which limits
court-ordered relief to those who have received actual injury, does not
apply to relief provided for in a consent decree. 8 The effect of this
decision was to allow consent decrees to circumvent 706(g). The Court
recognized that in certain instances relief may be provided to "individuals who [are] not the actual victims of a defendant's discriminatory
practices." 86 However, the focus of the Court's attention was on the
narrow issue of whether or not a consent decree is within the meaning

26.

Id. at 3069.

27.

Id.

28. The membership rejected the proposal by a vote of 660 to 89. Id.
29. Id. at 3070 (The court found "a historical pattern of racial discrimination in the promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department, . . . [and found] the use of a quota system for [a]
relatively short period . . . [was] not unreasonable .... ").The amended decree required the

City to increase the total number of promotions to lieutenant, captain, battlion chief, and assistant
chief. Id. The decree also required examinations for promotions to be administered in June 1984
and December 1985. Promotions based upon these exams "were to be made in accordance with
specified. . .'goals' that were expressed in terms of percentages and were different for each rank."
Id. The plan's effective period was reduced from nine years to four years. Id.
30. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 1985) (The
court declared the consent decree "fair and reasonable to the nonminority firefighters.").
31. Id. Following the oral argument in Vanguard, the United States Supreme Court decided
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (limiting relief under Title VII
to actual victims of discrimination). The court of appeals then requested supplemental briefs by
the parties and concluded that Stotts was not applicable in part because it dealt with an injunction, not a consent decree. Vanguard, 753 F.2d at 486.
32. Firefighters. 106A S. Ct. at 3071. For the text of the petition for certiorari, see id. n.5.
33. Id. at 3072.
34. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982).
35. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3072.
36. Id. The Court addressed the issue in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106A S. Ct. 3019
(interim ed. 1986) (Under Title VII, courts may, where appropriate, provide relief to persons who
are not actual victims of discrimination.).
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of the word "order" in section 706(g). 37 The Supreme Court determined that because of a consent decree's voluntary nature, such a decree is not an "order" within the prohibition of section 706(g). 8 Therefore, the affirmative-action plan was permitted to be implemented by
the City to provide promotional goals. 9
III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196440 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."1 This Act was an attempt by the federal government to provide
legislation aimed at preventing discrimination against minorities.' Section 706(g) establishes a specific limitation on a court's discretion
under Title VII by providing that a court shall not order race-conscious
relief "for any reason other than discrimination on account of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. '
A.

The Legislative History of Title VII

Title VII is an amendment to the bill" that eventually became the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The provisions of Title VII focus on discrimination in the private sector.' 5 Title VII's original purpose was to provide a statutory basis for the creation of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), whose function was to investigate
complaints of employment discrimination."" A considerable amount of
political posturing has rendered Title VII's legislative history uncertain,
but the courts have established that Congress intended to prohibit dis37. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3074. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
38. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3079.
39. Id. at 3072.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
41. Id. § 2000e-2.
42. Although the United States Supreme Court does not often rely upon legislative history
in interpreting the fourteenth amendment, the legislative history of Title VII is given considerable
weight in determining whether affirmative action is permited. United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 230-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). With the exception of Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 397-98 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting), the case
law in the area of affirmative action is lacking in any reference to the "original intent of the
framers of the fourteenth amendment." Schnapper, supra note 2, at 753.
43. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982).
44. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 110 CONG. REC. I1,930-34 (Mansfield-Dirksen Substitute Bill).
45. Section 706(g) of Title VII sets forth the authority of the courts to order relief if a
violation of the Act occurs. See generally Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title
VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887
46. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUs. AND CoM. L. REv. 431, 436

(1966).
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criminatory employment practices which are based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 7
Opponents of Title VII feared that the EEOC would find discrimination where ever there was racial imbalance.' The proponents
stressed that the EEOC's primary function was to prevent discrimination, not to insist upon exact percentages of racial distribution within a
company.49 Therefore, under Title VII, an employer could not be
forced by a court to employ or promote unqualified people simply by
virtue of their race, religion, or national origin. Congress was insistent
that hiring would be based upon merit, not upon a quota system. 0 The
extended debates in the House of Representatives and the Senate addressed the primary concern that Title VII would require hiring or promotion of employees to achieve a racial balance."
B.

The Congressional Intent of Section 706(g)

The purpose of legislation is often unclear on its face, necessitating
the courts' reliance on the legislative history to determine congressional
intent.52 The legislative history of section 706(g) does not indicate any
congressional intent to divest federal courts of their power to provide
equitable remedies.5 8 The proposition that courts are free to apply remedies to redress the interests protected by Title VII is also supported by
the legislative history.' In 1972 Congress amended section 706(g),
47.

For a discussion and analysis of the legislative history of Title VII, see Hill, The Equal

Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History
and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUs. REL. L.J. 1 (1977); Vaas, supra note 46.
48. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 1518 (1964).

49. Id. In the introduction of the bill that eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
H.R. 7152, the sponsor of the bill, Rep. Cellar of New York, responded to his opponents' criticism: "Even . . . [a] court could not order that any preference be given to any particular race,

religion or other group, but would be limited to ordering an end to discrimination." Id. (emphasis
added).
50. Weber. 443 U.S. at 234-38 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
51. Id. at 238. Senator Humphrey, the major force in the Senate behind H.R. 7152, responded by unequivocally stating "Title VII prohibits discrimination ...[and] is designed to
encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion." 110 CONG. REC.
6549 (1964). The dissent in Weber points to the fact that neither the opponents nor the proponents of the bill "suggest[ed] that the bill would allow employers voluntarily to prefer racial
minorities over white persons." Weber, 443 U.S. at 244 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).

52. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (Both the congressional purpose and the
language of a statute controls the remedies that a court may order.).
53. Amendment No. 656 to H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., I10 CONG. REc. 11,930-34
(Mansfield-Dirksen Substitute Bill). Congress substituted the mandatory term "shall" for the discretionary term "may." Id.
54. For a discussion of equitable remedies under Title VII, see Vaas, supra note 46.
55.

Equal Employment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 920261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (current

version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982)).
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giving the courts broader discretion to implement appropriate reme-

dies. 5e The one statutory limitation on a court's discretion under Title
VII is the last sentence of section 706(g) which provides that a court
shall not order hiring or promotion for any reason other than discrimination.57 The courts have arrived at various conclusions with regard to
the appropriate interpretation of this sentence,5 but the precise meaning of the limitation is not apparent from the legislative history.59
While it is significant that Congress was adverse to race-conscious relief under section 706(g) when there was no actual discrimination, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts6 ° suggests that the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to
section 706(g) "strongly supports the view that Congress endorsed the
remedial use of race under Title VII." 61

IV.

ANALYSIS

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Firefighters62
is limited to a relatively narrow legal issue, but the ruling is one with
broad practical significance. In rejecting the argument that a consent
decree should be measured by the same standard as a court order, 3 the
majority stressed that voluntary compliance as a means of achieving
the objectives of Title VII is the method preferred by Congress." This
refusal by the Court to give a consent decree the same status as a court
order under the auspices of section 706(g) warrants analysis, as does
the probable impact of this refusal on Local 93 and its general impact

in the area of civil rights.

56. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972). Congress added the wording "or any other equitable
relief' to section 706(g). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
57. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982).
58. See. e.g., United States v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union No. 5, 538
F.2d 1012, 1019 (3d Cir. 1976) (Title VII does not prohibit minority goals in employment.); Day
v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Title VII provides relief only for victims of
actual discrimination.).
59. Belton, Harnessing Discretionary Justice in the Employment Discrimination Cases:
The Moody and Franks Standards, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 571, 586 (1983) ("Some courts have construed this sentence to apply only to the substantive violation determination in stage I proceedings.
Other[sJ have taken the position that this sentence is applicable to the relief formulation stage.").
60. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
61. Id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. 106A S. Ct. 3063 (interim ed. 1986).
63. Id. at 3074.
64. Id. at 3072. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (The
primary objective of Title VII was to achieve equality in employment.).
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The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Title VII Section 706(g)

1. An Agreement or an Order?
A consent decree is a method of voluntary settlement of a controversy which is "signed by the court and entered as a judgment in the
case [and it has] . . .characteristics both of a contract and of a court
order." 65 The statutory authority that enables a court to enter a consent decree comes "from the statute which the decree is intended to
enforce,"6 6 and courts have utilized such authority frequently 7 under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
The Supreme Court in Firefighters did not address the issue of
whether the district court properly labeled the matter before it as a
consent decree. The facts indicate that when the district court was
presented with an agreement between the Vanguards and the City, 9
the court mandated that the Vanguards and the city include local 93 in
further discussions.7 0 At a second hearing71 the judge "persuaded the
parties to consider revamping the consent decree. '72 Finally, the three
parties underwent "[forty] hours of intensive negotiations under the
Magistrate's supervision and agreed to a revised consent decree. 7' 3 A
similar consent decree was then approved by the court. 4
The Court should have considered whether the decree was properly called a "consent decree" or a "coercive court order."' 75 The fact
that both parties consented to the revisions ordered by the court 76 does
not indicate that this was a consent decree which was entered into voluntarily. In fact, the district court did not approve the originally proposed consent decree or the revised consent decree; rather, the Court
ordered a different agreement. 7 By merely accepting the district
court's consent decree label, the Supreme Court has rendered the rest
of its own analysis suspect.

65. Schwarzschild, supra note 45, at 894.
66. System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employes' v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961).
67. See generally Schwarzschild, supra note 45. Antitrust cases were the first area in which
consent decrees became popular. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 319-20
(1928) (A consent decree was entered by the court without any admission of misconduct by the
parties.); see also Schwarzschildi supra note 45, at 888.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
69. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3068.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3069 (emphasis added).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 3070.
75. Id. at 3085 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
76. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 3068-69.
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2. The Participation of Local 93
Although the district court directed the Vanguards and the City to
involve Local 93 in their negotiations, when no consensus was reached,
the court proceeded to approve an amended consent decree,7 8 even

though the general membership of the Local 93 expressly rejected a
similar decree.79 Local 93 argued that the decree was invalid because

the Union had not given its consent.80 The Court responded to this argument by noting that the decree neither binds the Union nor constrains it, and although a third-party intervenor can present evidence
and raise objections at a fairness hearing for a consent decree, the mere
fact that an intervenor witholds consent will not be enough to block the
decree. 81 Consent decrees are implemented to facilitate voluntary settlement of claims, and Local 93 could not prevent the Vanguards and

the City from settling their own disputes. Local 93 was permitted to
intervene to voice any objections it might have had to the consent de-

cree. The district court considered the objections and ultimately re-

jected them8 2 because the Union had "failed to assert any legal claims
against either the Vanguards or the City."8 " The degree of union participation originally called for by the district court was swept aside by
the finding of the Supreme Court that if Local 93 had any substantive
claims to raise it could do so on remand.84 This participation might

appear to be compliance in form, although not in substance, creating a
problem of fairness for the nonminority employees who are directly affected by the district court's adoption of the consent decree. However,

the district court held two fairness hearings in which Local 93 participated, 5 and its participation is significant as the court thereby insured
that the interests of the Union were represented.

78. Id. at 3070.
79. Id. at 3069.
80. Id. at 3079.
81. Id. at 3079-80. The Court cites Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392,
400 (1982) and Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 711 F.2d 1117,
1126 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984), for this proposition that a three-party
dispute can end in a consent decree with only two of the parties in agreement. Zipes dealt with a
union that was allowed to intervene nine years after a judgment had been entered and just prior to
a settlement. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 388-91. Kirkland involved intervention under FED. R. Civ. P.
24(b). See Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1124. Whether "an intervenor as of right may block the entry of
a consent decree is therefore left unresolved by [both] cases." Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3085.
82. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3070.
83. Id. (The Union simply maintained that the decree was unfair.).
84. Id. at 3080. The district court retained jurisdiction to hear any challenges the Union
might have made. Id.
85.by id.
at 3068.
Published
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The Unconvincing Logic of the Court's Interpretation

1. The Importance of a Consent Decree Determination
The necessity of determining whether a consent decree falls within

the limitations of section 706(g) is directly related to the outcome of
this case. If a consent decree can be shown to be "an order of the

court," then section 706(g) prohibits the court from allowing the City
to use race as a basis for promotions unless each minority person to be
promoted can prove that he or she was an actual victim of discrimination. 6 Local 93 insisted that the last sentence of section 706(g) 87 precluded the Court from using Title VII to benefit minorities who were

not actual victims of the City's discrimination. 8 The Union based its
objection to the decree on the fact that the minority firefighters were
not actual victims and, therefore, did not fall under the protection of

section 706(g). 89 The Court rejected this argument, noting that since
this decree was not an order, the issue of whether or not a court may

provide relief to individuals who are not actual victims of discrimination under Title VII was irrelevant. 90 The Supreme Court, therefore,
did not dispute the possibility that a court's remedial power, in some

instances, might be limited by section 706(g).91
The Vanguards did not establish that they were actual victims,
although they might be able to show such evidence on remand. 92 Thus,

86. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982). Section 706(g) provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement
or hiring of employees ....
Id.
87. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982) provides:
No order of the court shall require . . . the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee . . . if such individual was . . . refused employment or advancement
or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . ...
Id.
88. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3071.
89. id.
90. Id. at 3072. Cf Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106A S. Ct. 3019 (interim ed. 1986)
(relief provided to individuals who are not actual victims of an employer's discriminatory
practices).
91. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3072.
92. Id. at 3080. The Court stated: "The only issue before us is whether § 706(g) barred the
District Court from approving this consent decree." Id. Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring
opinion: "The Court leaves open the question whether the race-conscious measures provided for in
the consent decree at issue here were permissible under § 703." Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/7
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had the Court not distinguished a consent decree from a court order,
section 706(g) would have precluded the consent decree which benefited the Vanguards.
2.

The Supreme Court's Analysis: From Weber to Stotts
In its analysis of the applicability of section 706(g) to consent de-

crees, the United States Supreme Court supported its position by comparing the facts of Firefighters with those of United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber 9 a which involved a private agreement rather than a
consent decree. 94 The Weber Court emphasized that a private agree-

ment to implement race-conscious affirmative action does not violate

Title VII. Although the private agreement was voluntary in Weber, the

employer's prior pattern and practice of discrimination provided a
ground for remedial action.95 The Court in Firefighters reasoned that

because of Congress' "strong preference for encouraging voluntary set-

tlement of employment discrimination claims under Title VII,"9 6 distinguishing between the voluntary action taken in a consent decree and
that taken in a private agreement, would undermine congressional in-

tent.9 7 As a result the Court questioned whether a consent decree

should be treated as an order within the context of section 706(g)9 8 and
found it "apparent that consent decrees are not included among the
orders referred to in § 706(g)." 99 The Court concluded that section

93. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The Supreme Court upheld race-conscious affirmative action of a
voluntary and private nature but did not consider either court-ordered affirmative action (this
question was not addressed by the Court until seven years later in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,
106A S. Ct. 3019 (interim ed. 1986)) or affirmative action implemented through a consent decree.
While the Court in Firefighters concluded that affirmative action was consistent with the spirit of
the law, both Justices Burger and Rehnquist objected to the majority ruling on the grounds that it
was contradictory to the statutory wording and to the legislative history of section 706(g) and was
therefore simply result oriented. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3085 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200.
95. Id. at 197. The Court's position was that since the agreement was a private, voluntary
agreement which sought to abolish the pattern and practice of discrimination by establishing raceconscious hiring, it did not violate Title VII. Id. at 208-09. By establishing a prior pattern and
practice of discrimination, the employees who were harmed by this practice are now benefiting
from the agreement.
96. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3073 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S.
79, 88 n.14 (1981)).
97. Id. The Court indicated that although this case deals with state action, there are limitations on a private employer's ability to enter into a voluntary agreement which affords a measure
of race-conscious relief. Id. at 3073, n.8. The questions concerning the application of section 703
or the fourteenth amendment were not at issue. Id. The sole issue raised by Local 93's petition
was whether or not section 706(g) of Title VII prohibits applying a consent decree as a remedy for
discrimination. Id. at 3071.
98. Id. at 3074 (The Court recognized that consent decrees embody characteristics of both
"contracts" and "judical decrees.").
99.byId.
at 3075. 1986
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706(g) does not restrict employers or unions from entering into voluntary agreements to remedy discrimination. 100 Local 93 asserted that the
language of section 706(g) should be read in accordance with the plain
meaning rule 01 and that the phrase "[n]o order of the court"'0 2 is applicable to court orders which are entered with the consent of the parties.' 03 In general, however, the plain meaning rule will not apply if it
can be shown that the legislature intended it to be otherwise.1 0 4 The
Supreme Court extensively analyzed the legislative history of section
706(g), but it failed to establish the precise meaning of this limiting
phrase and was unable to establish a legislative intent to exclude a consent decree from a court order. The Court merely suggested that if the
statutory limitation posed in section 706(g) is not narrowly construed,
the reasons for voluntary agreements will be undermined." 5
Even though its arguments were rejected by the majority, Local 93
was correct in its assessment of the language of section 706(g). The
words no order of the court are clear, and an "order of the Court entered by the consent of the parties does not become any less an order of
the Court."' 0 6 While the Supreme Court was sincere in its efforts to
dissipate the remaining effects of widespread discrimination, the decision itself leaves open a number of important questions about the reach
of this ruling. Furthermore, the decision fails to provide a cogent explanation of why a consent decree does not fall within the confines of section 706(g).
Although the Supreme Court endorsed the district court's imposition of a consent decree to provide relief to benefit individuals who were
not actual victims of discrimination, 0 7 a majority of the Court indicated that the limits which section 706(g) places on the remedial authority of a federal court are not implicated when the agreement is
voluntary.' 08 By confining itself to the narrow holding that section
706(g) is not applicable whatsoever to consent decrees, 0 9 the Court has
adopted an overly restrictive view of section 706(g). As the dissent in

100. Id.
101. Id. at 3071.
102. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982) (emphasis added).
103. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3071.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 50-59.
105. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3076 n.13 (Consent decrees have been used to settle disputes relatively quickly and the continuing jurisdiction of the court entering the decree allows an
easy method of enforcing the decree.).
106. Id. at 3087 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 3078.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3079.
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Firefighters stated, a court would be prohibited under Title VII from
ordering an employer to discriminate against an employee based upon
race." 0 Further, section 706(g) does not provide any authority to allow
an employer to "voluntarily" discriminate against that employee." '
The Vanguards argued that the City had engaged in discrimination, but they failed to come forth with any actual victims of that discrimination."' In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts"s the
Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether a consent decree,
providing preferential treatment to minorities, could be entered when
there were no actual victims of discriminatory practice. The Stotts
Court concluded that it could not impose something that could not
have been ordered had the case gone to trial. " 4 In Firefighters, the
Court distinguished Stotts by making a distinction between the adoption of a consent decree, as in Firefighters,and the modification of a
consent decree," 5 as in Stotts."6 The Court in Stotts focused upon the
critical language of section 706(g) dealing with the remedial authority
of a court:" 7 "No order of the Court."" 8 In concluding that this language does not apply to voluntary actions of employers," 9 the Court in
Firefightersdisregarded the notion that a court must be free to modify
the terms of a consent decree when a change in law results in bringing
the terms into conflict with statutory objections. 20
Under the Court's interpretation of section 706(g) in Firefighters,
employers and employees can agree to set hiring or promotion
"goals."'' Despite some genuflecting to the concept of equality, 2 2
the
Court's premise was that a consent decree does not violate the statutory
language or the legislative history of section 706(g) and that a court

I10. Id. at 3081 (White, J., dissenting) ("Title VII was not enacted to protect employers
against themselves, but to protect .
employees from racially discriminatory practices.").
IlI. Id.
112. Id. at 3066.
113. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
114. Id. at 589.
115. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3083.
116. The district court in Stotts attempted to modify a consent decree which it had approved to provide relief to minorities in hiring and promotion. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 567. The modification was entered to prevent minorities from being displaced by layoffs. Id. at 567-68.
117. Id. at 580-82.
118. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

(5)g (1982).
119. Firefighters, 106A S.Ct. at 3085.
120. See System Fed'n No. 91, Employes' v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, (1961). A court's authority to validate a consent decree, results from the statute which the decree is meant to enforce;
the court may reject terms that do not further statutory objectives. Id. at 651.
121. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (permitting the use of
"goals," but rejecting the application of "quotas").
122. Firefighters,
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can enter a decree to provide appropriate relief even if innocent em-

ployees are required to make sacrifices.1"'
There is little question that the Court achieved a fair result, even
though the logic used in reaching the result was questionable. To a
society which must cope with racial issues, the concept of a "principled

resolution"'", is not always viable. The problem "must proceed through
2
phases of compromise and expedient muddling-through"'

5

to remedy

the effects of past discrimination.
C.

The Impact of Firefighters

1. Impact on Nonminority Firefighters
The Court left unresolved the issue of whether any nonminority
firefighters who feel that they have been harmed by the consent decree
between the Vanguards and the City may successfully challenge the
7
decree126 either under section 703 of Title VI'1 or by the fourteenth
amendment. 8 The fact that the decree itself neither imposed legal duties or obligations on Local 93,129 nor foreclosed a nonminority's ability
to challenge 3 0 the decree on substantive grounds on remand was offered as a justification for allowing the consent decree to stand despite
Local 93's opposition. Other recent United States Supreme Court decisions, however, may indicate that such challenges are not likely to suc-

ceed.' 3 ' While this indication does not mean the nonminority firefight123. Id. The Court held that section 706(g) "does not apply to relief awarded in a consent
decree." Id.

124.

A. BICKEL, THE

LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

64 (1962) (A "principled" society is one

that will not admit to "expedient compromise" when dealing with racial problems, when raceconscious remedies may be essential.).
125. Id. at 65.
126. Firefighters. 106A S. Ct. at 3080-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (1982)).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. As a state employer, the City's actions are limited by the
fourteenth amendment ["no state shall"] and by section 703, which forbids discrimination on the
basis of any race. Therefore, if a white firefighter can show that he or she was denied a promotion
because a minority firefighter received preferred treatment, the restrictions of the fourteenth
amendment or section 703 might be applicable. In Firefighters, the consent decree activated additional slots for available promotions, and none of the white employees who would have been promoted under the old system was passed over for promotion. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3068-69.
The impact on nonminorities in this case was not great because white firefighters were not
displaced.
129. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3080. The decree, in binding the City to give an agreed
upon number of promotions to the Vanguards, did, in effect, bind the union who would have
riceived the slots if the consent decree had not been entered.
130. Id. (Because the district court had retained jurisdiction, it was still possible for nonminority members of the union to present any claims they might have had.).
131. In the past six years, the United States Supreme Court in three other decisions has
ruled on race-conscious relief in the area of employment, promotion, and layoffs. See, e.g., Sheet
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/7
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ers have no recourse, it does appear that courts are going to view their
plight as an acceptable adverse effect of attempts to cure "the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's
history." 132
2.

Impact on Affirmative Action
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Firefighters will

have an impact on affirmative action. The Court, in effect, stated that
employers and employees can voluntarily enter into agreements which
have broader remedies than might be allowed after a trial. 133 This approach gives lower courts an enormous degree of discretion to approve

broad relief 34 which may include racial preferences in the form of a
consent decree.
Despite the decade-long battle over affirmative action, many large
companies have continued to implement some type of plan that assists

minorities in achieving equality. 13 5 Those employers who have used this
controversy to discontinue affirmative action can provide no plausible
excuse to their minority employees for not proceeding forward. Voluntary plans should have more appeal to employers and employees than
long court battles.' 36 Even if the decision in Firefightersdoes not settle
every issue, it will encourage employers to initiate affirmative action to
remedy past discrimination through voluntary settlement.
3.

Impact on the Concept of Color Blindness

The concept of a color-blind Constitution and the concept of raceconscious remedies to overcome inequality are at opposite ends of the
spectrum. When Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' 3
Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106A S. Ct. 3019 (interim ed. 1986) (rejecting the argument that raceconscious affirmative action under Title VII is not available to individuals who were not actual
victims of discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106A S. Ct. 1842 (interim ed. 1986)
holding that no preference in layoffs was permissible, even though eight justices rejected an attack
on the use of racial preference, concluding that it might be allowed in hiring to remedy past
discrimination); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that an
employer could reserve fifty percent of its positions for blacks).
132. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
133. Title VII does not allow courts to order racial quotas as a remedy after trial. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1982).
134. Sheet Metal Workers, 106A S. Ct. 3019 (interim ed. 1986). The Court in Sheet Metal
Workers instituted general ground rules for affirmative-action plans. They must (I) be of limited
duration; (2) not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of white employees; (3) be tailored to remedy the precise discrimination; and (4) avoid quotas. Id. at 3050-52.
135. Even though the Reagan administration has largely ignored affirmative-action plans,
many companies have recognized the need to implement such plans and have continued to employ
minorities. Trippett, A Solid Yes to Affirmative Action, TIME, July 14, 1986, at 23.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
137. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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came before the United States Supreme Court, it appeared that the
Court would have to make a choice between the two, but instead the

Court ingeniously side stepped the choice.1 8" The Bakke Court found

that although quotas were unacceptable, race-conscious affirmative ac-

tion was an appropriate remedy. 139
Those who advocate that Congress should act in a color-blind

manner to remedy discrimination are playing a frightening game of
"see no evil." Admittedly, accommodating the needs of white employees who may be displaced by virtue of their skin color, even though

they had no direct participation in discriminatory acts against minorities, raises difficult issues. However, the "risks of adopting any colorblind whitewash" outweigh societal costs that may be incurred by confronting the reality of egregious discrimination which is still prevalant
in the United States. 40 While it may be convenient to believe that a
color-blind standard can provide for true racial equality, the problems
facing minorities may best be resolved in consciously eliminating racial
discrimination. At the very least, affirmative-action cases such as
Firefighters, Weber, and Bakke, affirm the fact that race-conscious relief is not unconstitutional when it is used to alleviate the effects of past
discrimination.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prior to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,1 41 the
Supreme Court had not addressed the constitutionality of "benign discrimination. 14 In recent cases dealing with affirmative action, the
138. Id. at 325-26 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell provided the pivotal vote on the Court, with Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun clearly favoring affirmative action and the use of raceconscious remedies if they are related to an important government interest, id. at 361-62, and
with Justice Stevens viewing equality as pristine, with no discrimination for any reason. Id. at
408-12.
139. Id. at 319-20.
140. Dimond & Sperling, supra note *,at 1087.
141. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
142. It is clear from Bakke and subsequent cases that the Court has yet to find a framework for evaluating affirmative-action programs which can command support from a majority of
the justices. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106A S. Ct. 3019 (interim ed. 1986) (approving an order requiring the local union to meet a 29% minority membership goal by a 5-4
majority and holding that courts may order racial preferences if necessary to rectify egregious
discrimination by a 6-3 decision); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106A S. Ct. 1842 (interim ed.
1986) (invalidating a school board policy of laying off white teachers, while retaining black teachers with less seniority by a 5-4 vote); Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (disapproving an
order requiring blacks with less seniority to be retained, while more senior whites were laid off by
a 6-3 decision);Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (approving affirmative action by a 6-3
decision); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (approving affirmativeaction plan by a 5-2 decision); This judicial wavering strongly suggests that a clear policy on
affirmative action has not yet been formulated by the Court. Each case is decided on an ad hoc
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/7
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Court has strained to address the problem of "conspicuous racial imbalance.' 143 InternationalAssociation of Firefightersv. City of Cleveland1 4 4 demonstrates that the Court can be a forum in which the political process can confront the problems and remedies of
discrimination." 5 By refusing to interpret section 706(g)146 as applicable to consent decrees, 4 7 the Court has resorted to the only available
alternative to a color-blind standard of application in employment
opportunity.
Although the Court has achieved an equitable result on the issue
of voluntary settlement, the method by which this result was achieved
lacks a clear justification. The majority appears willing to permit a certain amount of race-conscious action but managed to arrive at that result by fixating on the word order in section 706(g) of Title VII."48 In
doing so, the Court does not offer emphatic reinforcement to affirmative action. However, the Court does take an important symbolic stand
by determining that the continued existence of affirmative action
should not be denied by the Court. By relying on section 706(g) to lend
credance to its interpretation of a consent decree, the Court issued an
extremely narrow opinion" 4 9 that will almost certainly be challenged. In
this case, as in the past, the Court has shown a committment to affirmative-action plans and does not appear ready to invalidate them. But
with a shifting majority, 5 ' the outcome of a challenge may lead to a
different solution.
Teresa D. Jones

basis.
143. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
144. 106A S.Ct. 3063 (interim ed. 1986).
145. Opponents of affirmative action have raised the issue of "reverse discrimination,"
claiming that nonminorities who are innocent of discrimination, bear the cost of remedying racial
inequality. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (Powell, J., concurring). While the possibility of injury to innocent nonminorities is a definite concern, it must be remembered that to
totally prohibit any affirmative-action efforts will impose costs on innocent minorities. Dimond &
Sperling, supra note *,at 1068-79.
146. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 200e5(g) (1982).
147. Firefighters, 106A S. Ct. at 3072.
148. Id. at 3073-79.
149. Id. at 3080 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See supra note
142.
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